

~~SECRET~~

30 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs/SP, GPF, and USSR

FROM: C/NIC

SUBJECT: Topics for DDCI Briefing to HASC (Aspin)

When the SOVA outline comes up, I think we should strive to assure that the following topics are given at least some attention.

Nuclear vs conventional emphasis (Ogarkov Line) and how it might affect force modernization and war plans. We must stress that preferring a conventional scenario and modernizing to fight it does not mean giving up on doing one's best in preparing for the nuclear scenario. On the contrary, doing the latter is a necessary hedge and, more important, helps achieve the former goal through intrawar deterrence. This applies with or without arms control. In fact, the combination of INF, START, and conventional (standing) force reductions may make it easier and cheaper for the Soviets to implement the Ogarkov Line in ways compatible with revitalizing the economy. When the dialectics of this are understood correctly, much of the argument between our "conventional fans" and our "nuclear fans" appears a bit childish. I have a sense that the Soviet debate on Ogarkov-Gareyev has gone underground because it is very threatening to NATO. For budget reasons the debate is probably still open; nukes are relatively cheap compared to conventional forces.

"Defensive strategy". The academics (with SPD audiences in mind and maybe their own convictions) claim to believe a "purely" defensive posture is attainable. The military disagree. The military are right. A purely defensive strategy invites low cost experiments to defeat it. Failing to punish the attacker, it is a poor deterrent. But the Soviets could reasonably conclude that reducing some of the threatening offensiveness of their posture is politically attractive, economically rewarding, and militarily tolerable. We clearly see a debate on this, plus a lot of effort to influence the West.

"Reasonable sufficiency". This is partly a theoretical argument (can one design an inelastic demand curve for security, independent of the enemy?). It's partly an influence operation. But it's also a political argument in aesopian language over the scale and immediacy of the military threat, and hence about resources and even the political ideology of the system.

~~SECRET~~

25X1


SECRET

Defense spending versus investment and consumption. Obvious topic. It's important to note that a) we are really talking about questions of timing and pace of modernization and perhaps some reductions in standing force structure (but little reduction in the threat after mobilization); and b) about downward deviations in historical patterns of spending that are much smaller than those the US tends to experience during its retrenchments.

Arms control strategy and tactics. Gorbachev says he sees arms control as a critical part of ending the East-West struggle. We are skeptical. To what extent is Soviet arms control aimed at lightening defense burdens to help the economy? Or rather to help implement over the long haul a military strategy that may prove to be more threatening to NATO (Ogarkov Line)? A very tricky...and political...question, better reserved perhaps for 11-4. If arms control as an aspect of Soviet military policy is discussed, however, we shall have to address the significance of Soviet readiness to accept large, asymmetrical reductions and on-site inspection. Does this mean the beginning of the end of the Cold War or a more bold and enterprising way of conducting it?

Military personnel and the political clout of the military. On the agenda because Aspin specifically mentioned it, and it is one of the concrete indicators or a new scene since Brezhnev. Yet how much of a change really, and what is the political significance of the new emphasis on military-to-military contacts?

Just for fun, I'd like to see the testimony include the quotation from Zagladin on "past" Soviet pursuit of the "possibility of victory in nuclear war."


Fritz W. Enmarth

SECRET